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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 10/11/02
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,  
   13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$68.20
87.90
96.01
108.48
38.50
32.00
112.90
      *
122.99
$64.40
      *
87.00
98.27
31.50
14.50
84.57
71.87
164.92
$63.58
      *
85.50
97.95
32.75
      *
99.45
75.75
154.68
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.79
1.78
4.05
3.37
2.06
4.69
2.63
4.43
4.94
2.11
4.79
2.34
5.08
4.57
2.10
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
77.50
105.00
135.00
92.50
120.00
130.00
77.50
115.00
* No market.
Consumer concerns regarding the health and environmental
effects of inputs used in conventional production systems (i.e.,
fertilizer, pesticides, etc.), coupled with rising living standards
and/or subsidization of organic agriculture (i.e., case of the
European Union (EU)), have resulted in the development of fast
growing markets for organic food in several countries around the
world. “Organic” refers to food produced through a process
characterized by mandatory “soil building” crop rotations and
absence of synthetic inputs. The lack of synthetic inputs results in
reduced yields and, when compared to conventional food
production, the production of organic food is more labor inten-
sive.   
Despite the increased costs associated with the production
of organic food there has been a significant supply response to the
expressed consumer demand for organic products. In countries
like Austria and Switzerland, organic produce accounts for 10
percent of food production while the organic sector’s annual
growth rate in the United States (U.S.), Canada, France and Japan
exceeds 20 percent. The reason behind this supply response lies
mainly with price premiums enjoyed by organic food producers.
Premiums paid for organic food products have been estimated to
average at around 20 percent.  
Organic products are what economists call credence goods,
and the information about the nature of the product is asymmetric;
while producers know whether the product is organic or not, in
most cases the presence or absence of the organic characteristics
are not detectable by consumers even after purchase and use of the
product. Put in a different way, consumers do not know whether a
product is organic unless they are told so. In the absence of
information regarding the nature of the product, conventional and
organic products are marketed together and the price received by
producers is the same regardless of which product is produced. The
absence of a premium for organic products when those are not
segregated, coupled with the increased costs of organic food
production, result in the profitability of the organic food being
lower than that of its conventional counterpart. In this case, the
supply of organic food is not economically rational; market forces
lead to failure of the market to satisfy expressed consumer
demands.
The supply-side market failure that emerges when organic
and conventional food are marketed together can be avoided by
solving the information problem faced by consumers. Certification
and labeling of organic food can serve as a signal of the nature of
the offering.1 In fact, labeling based on third party certification is
the only feasible alternative to circumventing supply-side failures
of markets for organic food since, in its absence, organic food
suppliers are not capable of signaling the nature of their product.
Specifically, the inability of consumers to observe the organic
characteristic even after purchase and use of the product (and thus,
their inability to “draw” from past experience) deems “alternative”
methods of quality signaling such as the provision of warranties
and reputation building mechanisms, ineffective. 
Thus, along with the demand for organically grown food
also came the pressure for the establishment of standards for, and
labeling of, organic products. Governments in the U.S., the EU
and elsewhere have responded to this exigency by introducing
regulations concerning the standardization, certification and
labeling of organic food.2  
While certification and labeling of organic food products
purport to prevent market failures by providing information about
the nature of the product to consumers, truthful revelation of the
type of the product is not a given. When mislabeling of conven-
tional food as organic is profitable, rational economic agents’
compliance with the provisions of the labeling regime is by no
means assured. Suppliers of conventional food can misrepresent
the nature of their product (i.e., label it as organic) and take
advantage of the price premium paid for organic food, while
enjoying the cost savings associated with the production of its
conventional counterpart. 
 Cases of detected mislabeling are often reported by the
European press. It is alleged that, in the southern states of the EU,
mislabeled conventional products account for between 15 percent
and 40 percent of the organic labeled produce. Anecdotal
evidence on detected misrepresentation in the U.S. includes the
cases of Glacial Ridge Foods Company that mislabeled conven-
tional beans and barley as organically grown, and Petrou Foods
Inc. that was caught selling conventional olives, olive oil and
vinegar as organic. Presumably, consumer deception through
mislabeling can affect consumer behavior and thus, the market
acceptance of organic food.
Despite the increasing importance of organic agriculture
and the incidence of fraudulent behavior, a systematic economic
analysis of organic food product markets in general, and mislabel-
ing in particular, is virtually nonexistent. In almost all studies of
organic food products the possibility of mislabeling is “conve-
niently” assumed away, granting (implicitly) the certification and
labeling process sufficiency in circumventing failures of organic
food product markets. In fact, the assumption of perfect certifica-
tion (and thus, truthful labeling) is present in most economic
studies of markets for credence goods. 
In a recent article published in the Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics, I address the issue of mislabeling in
organic food product markets by systematically analyzing the
economic causes and consequences of consumer deception for the
purchasing decisions and welfare of consumers. My analysis
indicates that fraudulent behavior and mislabeling of organic food
products cannot be a matter of indifference - the effects of (the
conventionally ignored) mislabeling can be very significant.
In particular, my analysis shows that labeling based on
third party certification can mitigate asymmetric information
problems born from the credence nature of organic food, correct
supply-side market failures and enhance consumer welfare.
Contrary to what is traditionally believed however, the analysis
shows that while certification and labeling are necessary, they are
not sufficient for alleviating organic food market failures. The
market efficiency and consumer benefits from labeling of organic
food vary with the level of product type misrepresentation
(mislabeling) in the food supply chain. Consumer deception
through mislabeling affects consumer trust in the labeling process
and can have detrimental consequences for the market acceptance
of organic products. 
Specifically, the incidence of mislabeling creates uncer-
tainty about the true nature of the organic labeled product, which
reduces consumer welfare and drives part of consumers out of the
market for organic food. The greater  the extent of mislabeling, the
greater are the losses in consumer welfare, and the greater the
likelihood that the organic product market will fail. Thus, while
certification and labeling might correct supply-side market failures
by providing economic incentives for the supply of organic food,
an imperfect enforcement of the labeling regime might generate
demand-side market failure.
The detrimental welfare effects of mislabeling and the
market failure that emerges when consumer trust in the certifica-
tion and labeling system is relatively low underline the need for
reliable information transmission to consumers. An extensive
publicity of detected cheaters that can put reputation effects at
work and (reasonably) high penalties for mislabeling could be
moves in the right direction. At the same time, the potentially
significant costs associated with effective monitoring could be
recouped through increased user-fees (in cases where consumer
willingness to pay is high) and/or federal or state taxes (when the
distortionary costs of taxation are relatively low).
The role of private and governmental institutions in
enforcing producer compliance and guaranteeing the accuracy of
information conveyed in the label is crucial. This is especially
true for countries like the U.S., where a reduction in consumer
trust in the food inspection system due to incidents of mislabeling
could jeopardize the otherwise great prospects of the fast-growing
organic sector.
Konstantinos Giannakas, (402) 472-2041
Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics, UNL
Note: This article is based on Giannakas, K. “Information
Asymmetries and Consumption Decisions in Organic Food Product
Markets.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50(2002): 35-
50. 
This research has been funded in part by a USDA Cooperative State
Research Service grant through the Food System Research Group at the
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1 Certification is a process through which unobservable product
characteristics (such as the process through which they have been
produced) are “guaranteed” to consumers through a label. To avoid
conflicts of interest, the guarantee is usually issued by a third
(private or public) independent party whose ability to verify producer
claims is greater than that of an individual consumer.
2 For the specifics of the National Organic Program in the U.S. and
the EU regulation on organic production see
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop and http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1991/en_391R2092.html, respectively.
